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Integral gnosis and the material other
In this article, I look at Ken Wilber’s Integral Theory as mimesis. This invites me to look at Integral Theory in three ways. First, I look at Integral Theory as process 
of making materialistic alterity, thus maintaining and 
fortifying the spirituality of the self. Second, I look at it 
from the perspective of the dialectics of epistemologies 
of estrangement and intimacy, raising questions con-
cerning the legitimacy of the juxtaposing interpretative 
and explanatory approaches to culture. Third, I look at 
it from a social perspective, as a powerful instance of 
modern mimesis that creates a typically modern his-
tory. I will show how Integral Theory is grounded in 
the modern intuition of agency being distinct from and 
superior to the outer material world. To the extent that 
cultural agency has to materialize in some form, so does 
Integral Theory. My aim is to recall the close relations 
of scientific discourse with spirituality, even with magic 
and even more importantly, I want to show how sup-
posedly secular intuitions of identity and agency bear 
strong potential for spiritual and religious discourse.
In this article I focus on Ken Wilber’s idea of 
gnosis as something that can elevate one to higher 
levels of spirituality. My reading of Wilber’s Integral 
Theory is motivated by a tension I find between the 
explanatory potential of his ideas and his simultan­
eous demand for an interpretative approach in reli­
gious and spiritual issues. These, at least seemingly 
contradictory combinations, or vectors of knowledge 
are essential to gnosis.
Wilber’s view of gnosis provides an exceptionally 
systematic epistemology that provides an opportun­
ity to understand a core dilemma in New Age spir­
ituality. New Age thinking poses a challenge for the 
study of religion, because while from the etic point 
of view seems to entail a collective belief in sacral­
izing the subjective experience, from the emic point 
of view spiritual truth is found only from within. This 
combination leads to a discourse that rejects all sorts 
of external truths and beliefs, thus making the New 
Age movement an exceptionally challenging sub­
ject of study (Aupers 2012: 344). Wilber’s rejection 
of mainstream sciences and his demand for gnosis 
reflects this same pattern. My interest concerning 
Wilber’s gnosis, and New Age more generally, can 
be formulated into a question concerning how thor­
oughly subjectified spiritual experience can amount 
to social action. Here, the movement between inter­
pretation and explanation becomes important.
I see Integral Theory as a spiritual method that is 
based on the subject’s movement between an outer, 
estranged view and an inner, intimate view of reality. 
Both of these views are essential to Wilber’s idea of 
spiritual growth that opposes any given (i.e. external ) 
truths. Wilber’s claims concerning personal, social 
and global evolution show how spiritual aspiration 
gives rise to a history of constant renewals and lib­
erations from restrictions of outer material and social 
forms; to a history that finds its parallel in historic al 
Protestantism, as shown by Webb Keane (2002). 
While this process seeks to transcend mater iality, 
spiritualists still live in a material universe. Here 
Wilber’s gnosis comes into play. Gnosis gives rise 
to an experience of looking through the immanent 
into a body of presumed spiritual knowledge, giving 
rise to renewal and liberation from the external 
constrictions.
Even spiritual quests must have a starting point. 
While Wilber rejects New Age, he embraces the 
socially well­established truth­claims of modern sci­
ences. This, I think, reflects the close relation between 
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the discourses of spirituality and modern sciences. 
As I will later show, they both share typically modern 
intuitions of human agency and ideals of significa­
tion, that were, according to Keane (2002), first 
articulated in historical Protestantism. Hence, it is 
no coincidence that the spiritual history that Integral 
Theory produces finds its parallel in the history of 
(post­)colonialism.
Spirituality and the abstraction of material things
Essential to Wilber’s (2009) Integral Theory is an 
ontological postulation called holarchy, a unitary 
deep structure that everything in the whole universe 
consists of. Holarchies are not just a physical but also 
mental, and above all, spiritual in nature. According 
to Wilber, all holarchies are progressing towards 
more integrity, during which process psychologic al 
and ultimately more spiritual properties emerge. 
The ultimate goal of the cosmos is nonduality, where 
spirituality integrates everything into one. According 
to Wilber, evidence of this is apparent in biological, 
technological and social history, as well as in individ­
ual psychological development. The universe is on its 
way to spiritual integrity. (Wilber 2009: 61–92)
By contrast with this spiritual evolution, Wilber 
claims that Western societies are currently in a state 
of epistemic paralysis called Flatland. Flatland is 
possessed with the knowledge of materialistic sur­
faces devoid of real essence, depth and the spiritual. 
According to Wilber, humans have always been 
driven by spirituality, but postmodern relativism 
and the epistemics of Flatland make further spir­
itual integrity impossible. He calls this the ecological 
crisis between ego (internality) and eco (externality). 
Postmodern relativism is symptomatic of an epis­
temic position that fails to see beyond contextually 
(i.e. externally) determined knowledge. It denies any 
possibility of human access to absolute knowledge, 
and by this denial it keeps the human spirit strictly 
on the surface of the Flatland, blind to the holarchic al 
deep structure and spiritual evolution of the universe. 
(Wilber 2009: 63, 215–17, 341–8)
The epistemics of Flatland poses a threat to 
humanity both in the global and the individual sense. 
For example, the environmental crisis, cultural differ­
ences and the unsustainable use of natural resources 
all call for urgent measures while epistemic relativ­
ism  renders humanity powerless to face these global 
crises. At the same time, the knowledge of Flatland 
Misty dawn, Maidenhead Thicket, 14.11.2005. 
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undermines subjective wellbeing by overshadowing 
the realm of subjective cultural, religious and spir­
itual values, leaving less and less room for spiritual 
well being. Fortunately, there is an antidote to the 
condition of postmodernity; the Integral Theory that 
promises to lift the human spirit from the limbo of 
Flatland and to set it on its natural course towards 
greater spiritual integrity. (Wilber 2009: 39–55, 
400–22)
In Wilber’s philosophy, abstract generalizations 
seem to go hand in hand with spirituality. Obviously, 
spirituality does not automatically follow abstractions, 
because more often than not, theoretical abstractions 
are not spiritual. Nevertheless, Wilber’s philosophy 
reminds me of Talal Asad’s (1993) claim that abstrac­
tions of culture often unconsciously follow spiritual 
and religious influences (p. 27–9). Asad shows how 
the concept of belief was a product of the religious 
discourse of reformation in the sixteenth century. 
Belief was an answer to a crisis of meaning: when 
the authority of a common church was questioned 
and people worshipped God in many different ways, 
what was Christianity? Belief grasped the essence of 
different forms of religion and brought coherence 
to Christianity. But unlike the medieval notion of 
religion that was ruled by local churches and con­
trolled by the Catholic Church, the notion of belief 
also meant a shift of power from these institutions to 
believing individuals. Later, in his paradigm of nat­
ural religion Lord Edward Herbert defined religiosity 
as being ultimately about believing in God. This uni­
versalist definition was clearly biased towards reform­
ist influences (Asad 1993: 37–42). Wilber’s idea seems 
to follow a similar logic of seeking essence to create 
coherence, or integrity. And as he emphasizes, spir­
ituality must be understood from within subjective 
experience (Wilber 2009: 166–71). But before look­
ing into this, let’s look at how abstractions of culture 
can unconsciously become religious or spiritual.
When Portuguese merchants reached West Africa 
in 1470, they soon became aware of the peculiar way 
the local people seemed to believe in the magical 
powers of material things and objects. They saw this 
as idolatrous fetishism; as a belief in the supernat­
ural powers of man­made objects (Parrinder 1961: 
8), something that had been forbidden in the second 
commandment. Fetishism was an antithesis to reli­
gion; a non­religion. Later in the eighteenth cen­
tury, a Dutch merchant Willem Bosman visited the 
same region. He claimed that fetishism was a priestly 
conspiracy that prevented the development of native 
societies by confusing spiritual values with material 
values. Bosman saw that both the priest and the mer­
chants were after profit, but whereas the priests were 
intentionally misleading the naive ‘primitives’ for 
their own benefit, the merchants were sincere in their 
intention. (Manning and Meneley 2008: 11)
As Bosman’s reaction hints, the colonial other 
puzzled the intellectual sphere of Europe. In Europe, 
the need for a secular public sphere became ever 
more obvious. The globalization of capitalism called 
for a general theory of economics that wasn’t sub­
ject to the peculiarities of local exchange (Manning 
and Meneley 2008; Pels 2012: 27). During his visit to 
West Africa Bosman was in the process of develop­
ing one, and to his disappointment, fetishism broke 
certain laws he thought were universal (Manning and 
Meneley 2008: 11). The problem of the fetish was later 
solved by Victorian anthropology as Peter Pels (2012) 
shows. According to Pels, fetishism was a problem in 
relation to the naturalistic ‘modern fact’ of Francis 
Bacon’s early modern empiricism. This combination 
led to the blasphemous notion that human agency 
was materially determined. (Ibid. 27–8)
Early modern empiricism was opposed by the 
Protestant Church because it associated material­
ity either with the sins of Epicureanism or with 
idolatrous fetishism. The sciences were faced with 
theological accusations, but thanks to the scientific 
agnosticism of Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–95), the 
study of material physical reality managed to main­
tain its position. Huxley argued that materialistic 
description should be understood in relation to as 
yet unknown statistical facts. Because statistical fact 
wasn’t subject to the errors of human senses, eventu­
ally it was regarded as more reliable than that which 
meets the eye. Although this solution left theology 
outside scientific discourse, Pels argues that it implic­
itly hailed Protestant morals. According to him, this 
solution was one step in the process he calls the ‘new 
reformation’. (Pels 2012: 34–5) 
The new sciences were based on statistical analy­
sis and controlled laboratory experiments, which 
excluded domestic and spiritual sciences from the 
science proper. In this E. B. Tylor’s anthropology 
played a significant role. Tylor wanted to show that 
the preliminary stage in the evolution of a scientific 
society was already found within primitive cultures. 
But because of the Protestant Church, it could not 
be derived from fetishism, and because spiritualists 
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already used the concept of spirituality, a term Tylor 
had originally considered, he came up with the term 
animism, which relied heavily on Huxley’s ideas. The 
concept of animism referred to the projection of the 
human mind onto outer reality, onto inanimate, non­
human objects. Whereas primitives looked at things 
according to such projections, modern science had 
discerned that objects were separate from the subject. 
In line with Comptean positivism, Tylor saw that 
this separation was a first step in cultural evolution. 
Modern occult sciences and spiritualism in which 
matter functions as a medium were condemned as 
evolutionary remnants. (Pels 2012: 35–8)
Pels’ reading is influenced by Daniel Miller’s 
(1987) theory of objectification that emphasizes the 
inseparability of cultural agency from objectification 
(Pels 2012: 30). Miller sees objectification as the very 
potential to act in historically generated linguistic, 
material, institutional forms. Although the subject 
may lose the scale of these forms or by becoming 
subject to a more dominant action, the subject may 
fail to see these forms as his own creation, he never­
theless strives towards some form of actualization 
(Miller 1987: 179–180). Objects can appear to be 
alien, but following Miller’s theory, this alienation is 
a consequence of one’s own historical forms of acting. 
As Miller puts it: ‘Within the concept of objectifica­
tion lies a Frankensteinian image of a model, once 
externalized, turning away from and then against its 
human creators…’ (ibid. 180).
Isn’t Flatland a Frankensteinian image such as 
this; the great ideas of Enlightenment turned into 
a mockery of their original image? What about the 
fetish? From Charles De Brosse and August Comte 
to Marx (Pels 2012, 37) and Freud (Keane, Manning 
and Meneley), all define fetishism as the result of 
some sort of a category error which confuses the 
false with the true. Fetishism is a religion fallen into 
superficiality, it is an illusion created by capitalism to 
alienate human beings from their natural social life, 
it is a perversity that mistakes outer things as objects 
of sexual desire. Note the historicity here. That which 
is fallen, deluded, perverted, can be reinstated, dis­
illusioned, or straightened. To be accurate, Wilber’s 
Flatland is a bit different from fetishism, because he 
sees that the spiritual integrity is yet to come. In this 
respect, Flatland is different from fetish, which pre­
sumes an original state from which things have fallen. 
In fact, Wilber rejects ideas of returning to ‘harmoni­
ous’ societies as category­erroneous utopias. (Miller 
2009: 93–109, 410–19)
Tylor’s animism seems to provide a better com­
parison to Wilber’s arguments. While Tylor’s argu­
ment did not imply the historical fall, it did neverthe­
less entail the idea that animism was an error of the 
past that the process of cultural evolution will even­
tually fix. However, as I will later show, these kinds 
of normative arguments are motivated by a belief 
that there is some transcendent realm of truth hiding 
behind the apparent reality that sets the course for 
proper human action. In this sense, Tylor’s animism 
and Wilber’s Flatland are not that far from fetishism.
However, Pels shows that Tylor’s argument was 
possible only by supposing a categorical distinction 
between material cultural action and an abstract 
system of cultural meanings, a distinction that also 
presumed the categorical distinction between subject 
and objects thus solving the problem of fetishism. 
According to Pels, this amounted to the emergence 
of later social sciences. The ‘new reformation’ con­
jured entities such as ‘society’, ‘state’ and ‘economics’ 
and announced the necessity of social expertise as 
the heir to the Protestant clergy, by pointing out that 
human agency was some levels above cold mater­
ialism. Pels sees here the steps that anticipated the 
Saussurean split which attempted to solve the prob­
lem of fetish by abstracting it into the problematic 
relation between the system of cultural signification 
This bo-fetish from Benin shows how bundles of knowl-
edge are binded into fetishes. Notice the similarity 
between binding external things into a fetish and diagram-
matical bundeling of spiritual knowledge in the AQAL-
matrix. 
Jean-Pierre Dalbéra, 2009. CC-BY-SA 2.0, Wikimedia Commons 
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and human agency (Pels 2012: 38–9). Materiality 
became a mere mirror to human agency which was 
from now on understood as a distinctively immaterial 
agency. This leads us to Wilber’s notions of gnosis.
My view of Wilber follows an open­ended defin­
ition of religion and spirituality formulated by Birgit 
Meyer and Dick Houtmann (2012). According to 
them, religion and spirituality is constituted of things 
– an alignment of artefacts, spaces, places, words, ges­
tures, sounds, smells, architecture, participants, and 
so forth – that give rise to the presence of something 
other. While the presence of the other is something 
extra to the particular material things, its presence is 
nevertheless empirical (ibid. 3–4). This alignment of 
things can give rise to the presence of benevolent or 
malevolent spirits, gods and energies and such, but 
it can also give rise to alienating, threatening and 
strange entities. The other can be a presence of some­
thing that is not necessarily recognised as religious, 
as Wilber’s gnosis exemplifies.
Wilber’s gnosis as optical knowledge
Wilber (2011) argues that there are three levels 
of knowledge; the lowest being pre­symbolic, the 
second lowest symbolic and the highest trans­
symbolic knowledge. In pre­symbolic knowledge, 
the eye of the body responds to sensuous perceptions 
of the corporeal world without any conscious reflec­
tion. In symbolic knowledge, the eye of the mind 
responds to theoretical knowledge. It makes it pos­
sible to reflect on sensuous perceptions and add rep­
resentational content to perceptions of the corpor eal 
world in order to share one’s thought with others. 
Social interaction and scientific discourse are con­
fined to this level. The highest level of knowledge is 
trans­symbolic. It looks directly into spiritual reality 
without the need for any mediating symbolic repre­
sentations. Wilber calls this gnosis. These three levels 
of knowledge are hierarchical, where the higher level 
encompasses but transcends all the lower ones, but 
from the point of view of the lower  levels, one cannot 
grasp the higher ones without changing its episte­
mological nature to accord with the lower. Wilber 
admits that contempor ary science can study things 
at the corporeal, symbolic and even trans­symbolic 
levels, but its methods are restricted to the symbolic 
level, the level of Logos, which is why it is insufficient 
for an understanding of spiritual knowledge. This is 
where gnosis is needed. (Wilber 2011: 48)
This three­stage epistemology serves as a basic 
structure for Wilber’s ideas concerning spiritual evo­
lution. The basic idea is that one’s problems are caused 
by some sort of misinterpretation  occurring in the 
subject’s worldview, in other words, in one’s subject–
object relationships. Higher levels of knowledge can 
enable a subject to see these misunderstandings and 
to renew and integrate their worldview. But a true 
renewal happens only by attaining a spiritual point 
of view on one’s problematic worldview. Spiritual 
knowledge liberates the subject from the perverse 
subject–object relationship, thus making possible a 
shift to higher, more spiritual and integrated world­
view. Wilber sees that this sort of spiritual evolution 
is the solution to all personal, social, ecological and 
global problems. (Wilber 2009: 213–38)
Here we have a modern version of the age­old 
idea of a divine spark which is trapped within every 
being. When found, this spark is believed to liber­
ate the being from the confinement of flesh. The idea 
originates in the Gnosticism of the early centuries 
of the Common Era. It has existed within esoteric 
undercurrents in Western culture at least since the 
Renaissance, and it saw a revival during the counter­
culture of the 1960s and 70s when the esoteric under­
current became part of the imagery of popular con­
sciousness – what is often referred as the New Age 
movement. (Aupers 2012: 342–3)
How does one achieve gnosis? According to 
Wilber gnosis cannot be achieved via active pursuit, 
because it is transempirical and transrational. Gnosis 
is an instant insight found from within, without any 
outer mediating form, material, linguistic or con­
ceptual. One can only learn sensitivity to spiritual 
knowledge through years of meditational practice. 
Still, although the lower levels do not grasp spiritual 
knowledge or gnosis fully, they can nevertheless have 
partial and necessarily reductionist images of spirit. 
(Wilber 2011: 35, 44–7, 54)
I analyse Wilber’s gnosis from the point of view of 
Michael Taussig’s (1993) mimesis. Taussig is inspired 
by Walter Benjamin’s idea of culture as a universal 
human faculty of learning by mimicry. According to 
Taussig, acts of, for example, describing, represent­
ing, instantiating or exemplifying are magic acts of 
mimesis (ibid. 16). What interests me about mimesis 
is that it shows how interpretation and explan ation, 
estrangement and intimacy, are not necessarily 
opposing factors. They can also be understood as 
existing at the extremes of the same continuum, on 
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which there is a fruitful middle ground. According to 
Taussig, one can learn from what is new and strange 
only to the extent that it is presented in a familiar 
enough way. Ideal mimesis represents the other as 
faithfully as possible without being too alienating, 
thus diminishing the gap between self­identity and 
other. (Ibid. 7–15)
According to Taussig, Walter Benjamin saw that 
mimesis is grounded in the physiognomic nature of 
knowledge. Knowledge is always the end product of 
sensorimotor interactions with reality, the co­oper­
ation of the senses and the mind. For this reason, 
knowledge is always sensuous and situational, even 
in its most abstract conceptual form. Benjamin saw 
that modern photography and films have given visu­
ality a privileged position over the other senses as the 
source of knowledge. The photorealistic and moving 
imagery of modernity creates a visual illusion of 
bodily presence. Therefore, the modern human is 
conditioned to be impressed upon and moved by 
pictures. Influenced by Marx, Benjamin sees that 
pictures replace the social and bodily presence taken 
by capitalist production. Taussig sees that Benjamin 
reveals a bias of optical unconsciousness in modern 
knowledge. (Taussig 1993: 20–7)
For example, successful ethnographic descrip­
tions, written and photographed, can create the 
impression of actually being with the phenomenon 
described; an effect of ethnographical transparency 
if you will. This is the mimetic magic of modernity 
that follows the logic of Benjamin’s optical uncon­
sciousness. We have convincing portrayals of others 
which are convincing only because they have given 
up on tactile faithfulness in order to make the shift 
from the original context to the context of represen­
tation possible, during which process visual descrip­
tion is privileged. Optical knowledge can also lead to 
crude generalizations. According to Taussig, James 
G. Frazer’s typology of magic into copy and contact is 
a fine example of this. It presumed it was possible for 
an observer to distinguish whether the magical effect 
mediates via visual similarity between the ritual effigy 
and the target of ritual or via a former connection of 
the ritual effigy and the target. It presumed an out­
sider view of the observer, as though the anthropolo­
gist’s visual perception was somehow above sensual 
mediation. Frazer’s theory was a generalization of 
Tylor’s view of magic as a primitive mistake that con­
fused the ideal connection between things with the 
real connections, a confusion that modern science 
was already capable of distinguishing. Only as late as 
1973 did S. J. Tambiah prove that both science and 
magic used the logic of analogy between things, and 
analogy is always an idealization of the real. (Taussig 
1993: 20, 47–58)
Now we can see how the accusation of category 
errors are possible only if one takes one’s optical 
ideals of the other as realistic and therefore believes 
one is able to see where the other is mistaken. What 
the accuser misses, is that both his own ideal of the 
other and the one of the actual other, are socially con­
ditioned. This can be demonstrated by Gilbert Ryle’s 
(2009) argument on René Descartes’ substance dual­
ism. Ryle claims that Descartes’ argument is grounded 
in a category mistake. Being convinced of Galileo’s 
mechanics, Descartes began to wonder about the 
relation between mechanics and the autonomy of the 
human soul. Because he failed to find one, Descartes 
was convinced that they are of a different substance, 
ontologically separate beings. (Ryle 2009: 4–8)
As Ryle (2009) notices, the influence of the intel­
lectual sphere of Descartes should not be neglected. 
According to Ryle, at that time the ‘Stoic­Augustinian 
A deer hunt, detail from the mosaic floor signed Gnosis 
in the ‘House of Abduction of Helen’ at Pella, late 4th 
century bc, Pella Archaeological Museum. Signed ‘Gnosis 
made it’.
 Wikimedia Commons
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theories of the will were embedded in the Calvinist 
doctrines of sin and grace; Platonic and Aristotelian 
theories of the intellect shaped the orthodox doc­
trines of the immortality of the soul. Descartes was 
reformulating already prevalent theological doctrines 
of the soul into the new syntax of Galileo’ (ibid. 13). 
Regarding Ryle’s argument with respect to Taussig’s 
ideas, we can see how making an accusation of a ca t­
e gory error which is justified from strictly analytic al 
(i.e. optical) grounds, will nevertheless amount to 
making another kind of category error – one that 
passes over the social and sensuous logics of knowl­
edge. How does this relate to gnosis?
Ryle (2009) further argues that changing inter­
nalized knowledge of knowing how into external­
ized expressions of knowing that, is to change the 
very nature of things (p. 16–17). One needs to make 
comparison between several instances of a particu­
lar performance in order to recognize what parts of 
knowing how is meaningful enough to be put into 
representational form. For other people to find this 
representation meaningful, it must also be put into 
a familiar enough form. Therefore reasoning out 
a performance will never add up to the knowledge 
required for actually performing skilfully. A mas­
sive amount of the tacit knowledge of which know­
how is comprised never passes through the process 
of abstraction required for the act of representation. 
In this respect, Wilber is right when he claims that 
symbolically shared social and theoretical knowledge 
cannot grasp the full scope of knowledge. 
Ryle (2009) also argues that self­representa­
tional utterances such as those of possession, belief, 
aspir ation and knowledge should be understood as 
expressions of behavioural dispositions. They express 
‘inference­tickets, which license us to predict, ret­
rodict, explain and modify these actions, reactions 
and states’ (p. 108). Notice the indeterminacy of the 
ticket metaphor. With this Ryle wants to emphasize 
the nature of inference not as trundling along pre­
determined ‘rails’ but being open to a multiplicity of 
possible routes (ibid. 106–7). Furthermore, whereas 
Ryle emphasizes the nature of representational acts 
as abstract and general, he thinks that self­repre­
sentations as dispositional knowledge amounts to a 
vast array of knowledge concerning the way a person 
interacts with the outer social world.
In order to find the right dispositions from rather 
meagre self­representations, an act of interpretation 
is needed. Compared to the act of translation, for 
example, interpretation seems to be more inwardly 
directed, though it is never completely an inner act. 
While interpretation concerns things that arise via 
one’s interaction with the outer social world, from 
the subject’s point of view, the reflective act may seem 
to be a completely inner process with no mediatory 
functions whatsoever. How is this possible?
Let us compare Ryle’s metaphor of inference 
tickets with Benjamin’s idea of physiognomic knowl­
edge. What Ryle’s metaphor suggests, is that there are, 
though not socially determined, still socially preferred 
ways of acting, something akin to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
habitus. Like any knowledge, these socially preferred 
ways of acting are also internalized, and can be put 
into a representational form to some extent. But a 
lot of it remains as tacit bodily dispositions concern­
ing intersubjective acts, gestures, signs, and many 
other subtle hints entwined with sensuous data. 
When there is enough correlation between our inner 
physio gnomic knowledge and the outer social world, 
I think the act of interpretation can become a trans­
parent, even a lucid process.
Consider this in relation to the indeterminacy of 
the meaning of a conversation. Imagine an ideal con­
versation with a trusted friend on some deeply per­
sonal subject. It can be described as a dialogue towards 
a point of saturation after which words no longer seem 
to increase mutual understanding. This saturation is 
often followed by a feeling that any sudden change 
would break this moment of mutual transparency. 
Given that the inner physiognomical features of lan­
guage differ between individuals, that particular con­
versation has reached the degree of integrity that it can 
reach within that social constellation. Hence, further 
words, parties joining the conversation or changes in 
material surroundings risk breaking the integration. 
They can introduce something into the situation that 
either party of the conversation would find unfitting, 
even disturbing. The integrity of the conversation 
must be determined, not by meaning but by social and 
political relations (see Bakhtin 1981).
As my example shows, the familiar enough align­
ment between words, things and people can create 
images and landscapes to dissolve the boundaries 
between people and between people and things thus 
allowing a new field of social agency or, what I call 
‘common land’ to emerge. Along these emergent 
common lands, new possibilities for co­operation, 
new ways of solving problems, new ideas and innova­
tions arise, but also, new problems, challenges, and so 
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forth. But once this kind of landscape emerges, there 
is always the risk that an external influence breaks 
in, thus collapsing the landscape and its concomi­
tant agency and revealing its dependency on social 
and material things. This risk rises from the tension 
between optical knowledge and the sensousness it 
hides within.
Recalling Pels’ claims about the ‘new reformation’ 
conjuring unconsciously ‘Protestant’ common lands 
like the ‘state’ and ‘economics’, to what extent people 
can project into these their intimate values and 
beliefs without breaking the fragile landscape? This 
brings us to the problem of the paradoxical combin­
ation of subjectified truths and social action in New 
Age movements. Given the position of gnosis as a 
continuous discourse in esoteric history from early 
gnosticism to contemporary New Age movements 
and recalling Taussig’s idea of mimesis as a matter of 
portions of intimate familiarity and something other, 
I want to ask what kinds of alignment of things can 
amount to completely intimate yet socially meaning­
ful experiences?
The sincerity of gnosis
According to W. J. T. Mitchell (2012), accusations of 
fetishism reflect an age­old battle against words and 
material images. In the context of all three major reli­
gions of the word – Christianity, Islam and Judaism 
 – fetishism is often associated with the sin of idol­
atry. Idolatry has been condemned in the second 
commandment: ‘Thou shalt not make unto thee any 
graven images’. As Mitchell emphasizes, the concern 
about the act of (en)graving is revealing. (Ibid. 112)
‘Graving’, or making images in material form con­
nects the thing imagined to a particular place, more 
so than making images with words. It becomes sig­
nified with a handicraft of a particular person from 
a particular society in a particular culture in a par­
ticular historical context. In comparison, spelling 
out or making an image in writing is less bound to a 
particular context. Words are easy to exchange, easy 
to move from one context to another. It is hardly a 
coincidence that these three religions of the word are 
also the ones that are the most widespread religions 
in the world. Whereas words seem to allow a degree 
of mobility over materiality, thus giving rise to some­
thing emergent, engraving an image seems to confine 
the thing it represents into a particular human­made 
form. But to what extent is this true? 
As described above, there is a tension between 
universal images, or ‘common lands’, and particu­
lar images, as seen from a universalist and rather 
scholarly point of view. For example, scholars tend 
to describe indigenous religions as distinctively 
materialistic, as the history of colonialism shows (see 
Dommelen 2006). This should come as no surprise, 
given the fact that the modern academy and sciences 
share historical roots with the religions of the word. 
The tendency to privilege cultural action rather as 
immaterial than material and to condemn the oppo­
site as trickery or excess, seems to me to be some kind 
of hybrid of Puritan aesthetics and Occam’s razor.
This takes us to Taussig’s idea of mimetic space. 
According to him, indigenous mimesis is the co­
operation between material surroundings, gesturing 
hands and speech. Spirits and gods are made pre­
sent by bringing them into the concrete outer space. 
Taussig refers to this mimetic space metaphorically, 
as the womb. This indicates how modern anthropol­
ogy perceives of the creative powers of the shamans 
and healers as feminine. In contrast, modern mimesis 
is the optical abstraction of its predecessor. Being 
optic al, it is able to penetrate beyond the limits of 
physic al space, visible surfaces of matter and it is 
inclined to solve the mysteries of feminine reproduc­
tion. This opticality of modern mimesis creates his­
tory that separates modern from ‘primitive’. Modern 
society identifies itself with latest novelties and dis­
coveries revealed by optical mimesis. From a new per­
spective, the past seems confused and imprisoning. 
But because the project of modern ity still, although 
unconsciously, originates from a physiognomical 
interaction with reality, its identity is vulnerable to the 
mimesis of primitives. (Taussig 1993: 33–44)
Modernity is simultaneously amazed at and 
afraid of the ‘maternal touch’ of external creation. 
There is something familiar yet upsetting about it, 
something that Freud’s concept of unheimlich, trans­
lated as the feeling of uncanniness, describes. It is 
reminiscent of a suppressed but longed­for sensu­
ousness. But because modernity relies greatly upon 
optical knowledge, giving in to sensuousness risks 
losing control over things (Taussig 1993: 122). While 
Taussig puts his ideas in a rather provocative form, he 
catches something deeply modern, as Webb Keane’s 
anthropological research in postcolonial Sumba in 
Indonesia suggests.
Keane shows how a mission of Dutch Calvinists 
(Orthodox Dutch Calvinists) during the twentieth 
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century led into a shift from indexically interpreted 
modes of cultural signification to symbolically inter­
preted ones (Keane 2002, also 1997 and 1998). He 
argues that the shift is a consequence of the mod-
ernizing effects of Protestantism. He follows Charles 
Taylor’s definition of modernity, summed up as a 
belief in the historical and personal change rising 
from within and in the image of self separated from 
social and material commitments. However, to the 
extent that a subject somehow identifies with moder­
nity, it must be recognized from social outer prac­
tice. Thus, a modern subject overlooks the apparent 
materiality and identifies itself only with the inner 
meanings and ideals. Here, the ideal of sincere speech 
becomes essential. (Keane 2002: 68–9)
According to Keane, the logic of modernity can 
be seen in a Protestant mission that paradoxically 
insists on a new beginning and a revival of original­
ity. Among the seventeenth century English Puritans 
fleshly rhetorics were seen to be distorting the divine 
truth. Speech was to reflect the Puritanist lifestyle; 
one divested of excess. At that time there were ambi­
tions in the Royal Society to formulate a purely objec­
tive natural language purified of errors. These two 
aims were combined in missionary activities on the 
frontiers, where scientific objectivism was used as a 
means of disenchanting traditional beliefs concerning 
the enchantment of external things. Scientific objec­
tivism then has provided a means for missionaries to 
disenchant traditional beliefs. Conversion (and cap it­
alism) has been possible only after natives have been 
convinced that outer things are not spiritual agents. 
Although the ideals of spiritual liber ation are age­old 
ideas, before the Reformation of the sixteenth century 
the idea was rather the preserve of the religious elite 
and the wealthy. The vernacularization of the Mass 
and the Bible was believed to liberate everyone from 
idolatry and the power of the Catholic clergy, return­
ing faith to religious individuals (Keane 2002: 66–8). 
In a historical sense, Protestant conversion has marked 
a new, modern era, while within the Protestant ethos, 
it marks a revival of the original order of things.
Keane observed such a process occurring in 
Sumba. Traditionally, the Sumbanese engage in a 
marital exchange that mediates a gift of blood (and 
spirit and life) from the bride’s lineage to the hus­
band’s, creating a depth of connection that forms the 
basis of political and kinship alliances. The exchange 
can be very expensive, as the husband draws many 
supporters to gather ‘male’ valuables such as cattle, 
horses and gold to wife’s lineage and their sup­
porters, who reciprocate with ‘female’ valuables of 
clothes, pigs and ivory. From a modern perspective, 
this exchange seems to bind human agency under 
the ‘spell’ of materiality, as if modern agency were 
not materially conditioned. According to Keane, the 
modern intuition speaks of the union of capitalism 
with Protestantism which sees materiality being sub­
ordinated to human agency. (Keane 2002: 70–1) 
But modernity takes its toll. Elders who were 
brought up in the traditional way of life, regarded 
the Western marriage ideals as anarchistic. For them 
such a denial of good fortune (exchange) is not just 
a denial of another person, but a denial of God. Even 
the smallest exchange effects person’s spirit (dewa) 
either positively or negatively, and that has conse­
quences for future exchange. For them, exchange is 
the micro­politics that effects, via social circulation, 
one’s own and everyone else’s opportunities to inter­
act in society. A denial of exchange would reduce 
human agency to that of an animal which is driven by 
mere instinct. Amongst the younger members of the 
population, who were more accustomed to a modern 
lifestyle, the ceremonial exchange became a represen­
tation of the bride’s honour, not a measure of it. It was 
radically reduced in size, because a lifetime of depth 
did not serve its original purpose in a modernized 
society. While traditional things were still engaged 
in during the ceremony, they were regarded as signs 
of tradition, not as practical or valuable. Keane sees 
this as a shift in the representational economy. While 
the external aspects of the ceremony as ritual remain 
much the same, it had taken on completely new 
expressive and practical functions. The ceremonial 
gift was no longer regarded as causally effective, and 
the materiality of its objects had only an arbitrary 
relation to their meaning. (Keane 2002: 71–4)
The ideal of sincere speech is central in this shift. 
According to Keane, the ideal of sincere speech entails 
that inner ideas and outer things reflect each other, 
not just by coincidence, but intentionally. Hence, this 
ideal privileges inner thoughts over outer things, and 
as such it speaks of the sincerity of a person, not of 
things. Thus, the ideal has normative dimensions 
that relates its subjects to material and social things. 
Sincere speech is intended for other people to evalu­
ate how one’s words harmonize with outer things. If 
words and things harmonize well,that means that the 
words are sincere and they prove that the speakers 
thoughts are just as sincere as his words (Keane 2002: 
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74–6). As we can see, the ideal of sincere speech 
amounts to a normative ideal of alignment between 
words and other outer things that emphasize the 
presence of inner ideals and beliefs over materiality.
As Keane (2002) points out, the Sumbanese pros­
elytes often saw the modernizing promises of the 
Protestant missionaries as naive willfulness (p. 77–8). 
Why? Because there were no proper frames for those 
promises. For example, because theKarhu Sumbanese 
understand language as being socially determined, 
converts found the ideal of sincere prayer difficult 
to actualize. They became obsessed with the possible 
outer origin of their prayers. To solve this, mission­
aries taught them to close their eyes while praying. 
Traditionally, the Sumbanese are disposed to distrust 
the subjective realm, and think that God and the 
spirits of ancestors cannot be reached from within, 
as the missionaries teach. In their traditional Marapu 
ancestor rituals, the ritual speaker does not speak 
words of his own, but canonical couplets spelled in 
li’i words of ancient ancestors. These words distrib­
ute agency only to outer things and words and not 
to human subjects. The Bible translator Louis Onvlee 
tried to find a li’i version of the phrase ‘to pray’ only to 
find out that it is an impossibity in li’i terms  because 
there were no intentional structures in li’i words. For 
the Sumbanese, Protestant promises were excessively 
ideational and ineffective, lacking any concrete pres­
ence. (Keane 1998: 23–9)
Eventually, converts found frames for the modern 
idea of the ‘state’. Traditionally, the Sumbanese name 
each other according to the different social contexts 
people are engaged in. By contrast, a Christian name 
is stable in two senses. It is registered in Heaven and 
in the registry of the modern state. This combination 
of state and church helped to make Christianity pre­
sent in everyday practices. Because in Sumba bap­
tism is not enough to confirm one’s faith, adults go 
through public confirmation ceremonies that share a 
striking outer resemblance to official state presenta­
tions. The sermon is delivered in a pedagogical and 
formal register like public announcements, the align­
ment of the stage and the spectators follows the form 
of state presentations and the attendants of the cer­
emony are cashed over goods, and the confirmation 
is public like any state presentations. Traditionally, 
Sumbanese society is structured as a social hierarchy, 
by rank, clan, marital identity and so forth, and this is 
why the Sumbanese are very anxious about publicity. 
(Keane 2002: 78–80)
Front view of a detail from a textile from Sumba depicting 
an ancestor figure (Marapu) using a supplementary of the 
warp, 1899. 
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This publicity plays a central role in confirmation. 
The performative structure of confirmation amounts 
to a situation of negotiation where all parties are pre­
sent: the one being confirmed, God via a cleric who 
performs as a civil servant of God, installed in his post 
by the church, and the congregation, who act as  wit­
nesses to the confirmation, enacted between God and 
the confirmed one. When it is done, the confirmed one 
becomes part of the congregation. The performance 
moves the conscience of every individual in the con­
gregation. Having themselves once been in the same 
awkward position, they can relate to the confirmed 
one. Thus, the performance marks the moment when 
the confirmed one is authorized to speak sincerely 
and the congregation becomes obliged to intervene 
when necessary. (Keane 2002: 80–2)
This ritual is interesting in relation to Taussig’s 
mimesis. As noticed by Keane (2002: 82), on one 
hand, the ritual can be seen to be putting the ideal 
of sincerity faithfully into conventions of Sumbanese 
interaction by combining bureaucratic rational­
ity with sincerity. In order for a sincere speech to 
have any credibility in Sumba, it cannot be the sort 
of spontaneous outburst from the subjective realm 
customary to Protestantism. It needs to be put in the 
form of a public performative act so that it can be 
read as indexically efficacious. One the other hand, 
the confirmation can be seen also as being faith­
ful to the doctrine of congregational discipline of 
Orthodox Dutch Calvinists. Keane claims that in a 
Weberian reading this is the logical consequence of 
liberal ideals and sincerity of speech. If the member­
ship of the church is in no way obligatory, it becomes 
a subject to social negotiation, performed as public 
confessions in orthodox Calvinism. Ritual formality 
can be read as reflecting Protestant suspicions con­
cerning strong emotions and the division between 
spiritual and material matters, stripping outer signs 
of their power to reflect internality. According to this 
interpretation, the seemingly contradictory combin­
ation of sincere speech and formality is not just a syn­
thesis of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ Sumba.
Let us look into the tensions which arise between 
these interpretations. While both are respectable 
interpretations of the ritual, they reflect different 
approaches to a ritual, be they directed from within 
or from a more estranged perspective. But to what 
degree is this dichotomy legitimate? While the view 
from within perceives the religious meaning, it is also 
an optical interpretation in the sense that it rushes into 
the religious meaning of the ritual and overlooks the 
meditative process of the material ritual context.  It 
also neglects the role of the physiognomical familiar­
ity of the performative structure of the ritual. While 
there is a danger of a reductionist reading associated 
with the estranged view, or rather the processual view, 
it is sensitive to the fine tunings of mediation, because 
it looks at it within the context. Also, because the opti­
cal view overlooks materiality, it risks taking the reli­
gious or spiritual agency for granted.
This risk associated with the optical arises from 
the idea of religion being ultimately something 
internal. As Asad stresses, the shift of emphasis 
from practice to belief does not imply a removal of 
outer materiality from religiosity, nor a disregard 
for the religious institutions. Rather, it has meant an 
increased emphasis on the believing self instead of the 
worshipping self in the self­interpretations of one’s 
religious life. In practice, religious practice was still, 
necessarily, dependent on material social and insti­
tutional contexts (Asad 1993: 36). For religion and 
spirituality to be internal, they must be made inter­
nal. This is established following the idea of sincere 
speech. Here, Keane sees a suppressed link between 
the modernist view of language and things and 
the more theologically oriented view expressed by 
Protestant and other religious reformers: the value of 
freedom and abstraction lies, at least in part, in their 
offer of transcendence beyond the confinement of the 
social and material (Keane 2002: 83–4). The outer is 
there only for one’s own sake, as an outer mirror of 
one’s inner cosmos. Wilber’s Integral Theory follows 
this logic faithfully.
Now, looking at Wilber’s gnosis from this point 
of view, it can be defined as an inner experience 
that arises via a certain sincere enough alignment of 
social things, which is why it appears to be so imme­
diate and unproblematized. However, because outer 
things are social, there’s no sovereignty over these 
alignments. Hence, the alignment can alter in such 
a way that one finds the presence of things alienat­
ing. It becomes problematic, and subject to conscious 
estrangement. Its nature as materially mediated and 
socially conditioned is revealed. Yesterday’s spirit 
turns into a Frankensteinian image that haunts the 
presence, where one seeks to locate oneself in a yet 
unproblematized epistemological position. Along 
this movement, the Frankensteinian image is trans­
cendent and left to petrify into the sediments of 
history.
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The AQAL model: the Great Mother of modernity
‘Although it is impossible to change the world, it is 
always possible to change oneself instead.’ This truism 
reveals central intuitions about modern magic. While 
it denies that the world can be changed outwardly, 
it encourages the same thing inwardly. Why is that? 
The reason is the same as that which motivated the 
emergence of the category of belief; a crisis of mean­
ing. The postmodern world is defined by the emer­
gence of knowledge that is rather fragmentary than 
coherent; what one can do but keep up with the pace 
and try to adapt and live along? We must reach out to 
each other. We must create ‘common land’ in order 
to solve ever emerging problems. This is the mimesis 
we do every day. Within this lies a seed of spirituality 
that Wilber so eagerly preaches.
The AQAL model, a diagram matrix of Wilber’s 
view of the cosmos, shows the location of all things 
in the cosmos. It situates all things in relation to each 
other. It has a place for external and internal things 
as well as for individual and complex things, but also 
for things in the past, present and future. It has all 
the things in cosmos put neatly into place. Despite 
its explanatory power, I don’t think the explanatory 
function is key to Integral Theory. Rather, I think that 
Integral Theory facilitates the renewal of the spiritual 
connection between the inner and outer cosmos. It 
gives the necessary metapragmatic frames for spir­
itual quest and identity. But first, one needs to find 
oneself within the cosmos Wilber describes.
This is done by tapping into the already established 
realm of truths; scientific discourse. In a secular soci­
ety, people are convinced by science. The burden of 
proof is associated with religious and spiritual insti­
tutes rather than with science. As James R. Lewis 
(2010) shows, scientific discourse has a charisma 
The AQAL model: an Integral Map. integrallife.com.
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that can legitimize religious and spiritual author­
ity. Carrying the legacy of a positivistic era, science 
is commonly recognized as the source of truth and 
therefore appealing generally. For more educated 
people, science is also appealing because it is asso­
ciated with rationality (Lewis 2010: 8–10). Wilber 
supports his claims not only by referring to spiritual 
traditions, but to numerous scholars with great phil­
osophical and scientific prestige from wide range of 
fields, though most importantly from developmental 
psychology. Also, Wilber’s work A Brief History of 
Everything (2001) no doubt benefits from the prestige 
of Stephen Hawking’s Grand Unified Theory that he 
presented in his work A Brief History of Time (1988). 
Another proof of this is Wilber’s affiliation with pat­
terns and diagrams that he does not hesitate to use. 
The use of such diagrams indicates at whom Wilber 
is aiming his ideas. An ability to read diagrams is a 
privilege of educated people living in technologically 
advanced societies.
Once its potential for tapping into the truth is 
established, Integral Theory can work. For example, 
the AQAL model helps a person to locate and iden­
tify themself and their problems. It helps to figure out 
the way to solve those problems via spiritual rebirth, 
which happens within one’s subjective experience – 
termed ‘the interpretive context’ by Wilber. This is 
well presented in Wilber’s Integral Semiotics which 
delineates a route of spiritual transformation (2014). 
I call the AQAL model, metaphorically, a portrait of 
the Great Mother of modernity, and the interpre­
tive context of it as its mimetic womb par excellence. 
But as it, and Integral Theory in general, is a picture 
made of the most general features of the process on 
renewal, it lacks contextual sensitivity.
Its opticality is also the reason why engagement 
with Integral Theory can lead to a spiritual experi­
ence. Being a stable framework, it serves as a map for 
one’s quest to find integrity in a reality that is com­
plex, fragmentary and changing. Within a process 
of personal growth, the person experiences a change. 
But because the outer reality is still moving on and 
fragmenting, the change must have been internal. 
The AQAL model shows that it is a spiritual change.
The AQAL model and also such tools as the 
Kosmic Address and the Giga Glossary, work like 
magical fetishes. Like fetishes which are dressed up in 
things signifying vast amount of historical, local and 
contextual knowledge, these tools are also packed 
with information in simple ideational forms, purified 
of contextual knowledge. This makes Integral Theory 
very convenient for contemporary capitalist techno­
logical societies. It can levitate above the material 
world, leaving the realm of materiality conveniently 
as the other, the Flatland, where non­spiritual actions 
can continue on their way. To put it another way, 
Integral Theory is based on the idea of a Saussurean 
sign following what Keane calls the representational 
economy of modernity that aligns with the idea of 
materiality as resource for capitalist economy and as 
such subordinate to human agency (Keane 2002: 71; 
2003: 422).
The spirit of matter slips into Wilber’s Integral 
Theory too. As Keane (2003) also stresses, the pro­
cess of signification that the modern subject identi­
fies symbolically, is in practice still based on indexic al 
mediation (p. 411–17). We have already seen a similar 
tension in Wilber’s gnosis that appears from within 
as immediate, transparent spiritual insight, but from 
the outside view as materially mediated and socially 
conditioned knowledge. Likewise, as my view of the 
AQAL model shows, Integral Theory and its tools 
utilizes the power of presence, which is the power 
of sensuous experience. While the sensuous power 
of fetish is consciously accepted, in Wilber’s Integral 
Theory, this acceptance is more unconscious.
Conclusions
My findings support Steph Aupers’ (2012) idea of 
an under theorized epistemological shift in the reli­
gious climate from (religious) belief to (spiritual) 
experience that he sees motivating an unexpected re­
enchantment of a secular and capitalized modernity 
(340). It seems as if the experience of presence as yet 
uncategorized and unproblematized is a place where 
spiritual realities can emerge. That place is the litmus 
test of spirituality, and the result depends on how one 
interprets it, materially or spiritually. As my reading 
shows, the interpretation of such presence as spirit­
ual depends on the way the external objects align. If 
they align properly, sincerely, they mediate spiritual­
ity, breaking down the boundary between inner and 
outer. But if they do not align properly, a realm of 
opaque and suspicious materialism appears.
This amounts to a set of political questions. This 
uncategorized presence is also the realm where reli­
gious, spiritual and scientific discourses all try to gain 
hegemony. Regarding this I want bring up the accu­
sations of neglecting human values over capitalist 
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values which are directed at established sciences by 
so called ‘fringe sciences’ and perhaps in other ways 
around too. From the point of view of my analysis, it 
seems that the spiritualist view is inclined to take a 
rather optical view of things and while this view can 
be very sensitive to subjective meanings of material 
things, it lacks perspective on the social meaning of 
the materiality of those things. Of course, the estab­
lished sciences are not flawless in this sense. From 
rather similar premises, Asad (1993) criticises sym­
bolic anthropology as being in danger of putting too 
much weight on the self­representations of believing 
subjects (p. 30–48).
While my view of Integral Theory is rather 
critical, I want to stress its importance as revealing 
modern intuitions of agency and identity. The fron­
tier where our agency breaks down is located where 
there are people we do not know or understand, cul­
tures that are strange to us, things we respond towith 
suspicion. At these frontiers we see how our sincere 
beliefs shift into beliefs about other people’s insincer­
ity. This is the same colonial frontier where primitives 
fall into fetishism and idolatry and into the realm of 
materialist Flatland. This intuition tells that we seem 
to identify ourselves rather with spirituality than with 
materiality. This makes one wonder to what extent 
the concepts of identity and agency rely on the idea of 
the human being as something distinct from mater­
iality, on an idea that is found in religious and spir­
itual traditions throughout milleniums. 
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